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I. Introduction
Scholars frequently debate the meanings of classical words
that do not necessarily have direct modern language parallels.
Words like the Greek othismos and the Latin virtus are poorly
understood, and modern scholars strive to provide these words
with specific definitions. The Romans saw their virtus, a term often
inadequately translated as the English word “virtue,” as a major
factor in their conquest of the Mediterranean. In this context, the
Romans focused on their military virtus, a term that includes
numerous intricacies of Roman combat ideology but can be
simplified by the translation “martial courage.” However, the
Romans also used virtus to describe men, women and objects off
the battlefield, and in these cases virtus can also exhibit the
adjectival qualities of the English word “excellence.”
These two uses of the term virtus are oversimplifications
though. Donald Earl presented virtus as a word defining a
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multitude of complex physical and moral ideas and practices. 123
While many more modern scholars oppose Earl’s view, it is clear
that the term virtus does not necessarily define anything specific.
Instead, the context gives virtus its meaning. The multitude of
times virtus appears in the Latin lexicon, as well as the numerous
different connotations and situations the word is found in, suggest
a more broad usage of the term than modern scholars care to
admit. 124 From the literary sources available, three primary uses of
virtus appear: a more general one meaning “excellence,” and two
more specific meanings revolving around the battlefield and
aristocratic competition in the Roman Republic.

II. Virtus as a General Term
Virtus was often used in military histories, accounts, and
other such documents to describe a soldier or general’s actions on
and recently off the battlefield. Virtus is also frequently found in
poetry, theatre, and philosophical writings. One of the most famous
of the non-military uses of the word virtus is in Cato’s De
Agricultura, where Cato claims that the best land has natural
virtus. 125 Some scholars contribute this usage of virtus to Greek
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influence over the Latin vocabulary. 126 If this was true, virtus
should have lost, or at least changed, its original, more military
meanings based on Greek influence as well, which, with evidence
from later and contemporary military documents, is certainly not
the case. Myles McDonnell, a modern proponent of the Greekinfluence theory, suggests that all uses of virtus in Roman plays are
simply mis-translated versions of the Greek term for excellence,
ἀῥἐῐᾐ. 127 Further, the other uses of virtus in this way (such as
Cato’s usage in De Agricultura), according to McDonnell, can be
attributed to a similar blending of the two different words that may
have occurred during the Pyrrhic War. 128 McDonnell uses these
arguments to attempt to explain away these general uses of virtus,
and yet, even if the linguistic blending did occur, these uses still
existed.
There is another possibility to explain these usages of
virtus: perhaps these Roman writers were simply speaking
metaphorically or with a sort of hyperbole. Classical scholars often
see the word virtus and assume it is being used literally; in
comedic theatre it is more likely the word would have been used
ironically, and in other writings, such as Cato’s, the word virtus
may have appeared so that a more general audience could
understand the meaning. Ancient sources cannot always be
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translated verbatim, no more than any modern languages can be
translated fully into another language due to metaphors,
euphemisms, idioms, and other cultural and linguistic tools.
The Roman comedies of Plautus frequently use virtus in
both military and non-military contexts. In Plautus’ Asinaria, a
slave recounts his own virtus involved in his acceptance of his
position in life, including his courage in enduring his master’s
beatings. 129 Modern scholars, such as Myles McDonnell, tend to
argue that this instance is parody, and that a slave with virtus
would have been a humorous concept to the Roman audiences of
Plautus. 130 However, the Romans themselves would have also seen
the slave in question as exemplary, a slave who accepted his place
under his master was preferred to one who rebelled or disdained
his job. 131 In that context, virtus could be used to define an
exemplary, or “excellent,” slave, and so maintain the general
meaning of “excellence.”
Another example of a somewhat odd usage of virtus comes
from a later source: Cicero. While Plautus sometimes gave women
the descriptor of virtus, Cicero is better known for describing his
own wife’s virtus. 132 Myles McDonnell mentions this instance as
well, but simply glosses over it as a late Republican conception of
129
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the word. Plautus’ use of virtus to describe clever women, as well
as Cicero’s wife’s virtus of excellence and competence as a wife
and mother, show a continuity of the usage of the word from the
middle Republic to the late Republic in that specific context.
Regardless of the linguistic origins of virtus being utilized
in this general way, it appears frequently enough that the general
meaning has to be a part of the overall definition of virtus. There
are so many examples of land having virtus, women having virtus,
slaves having virtus, and other non-Roman-male’s having virtus
that a less specific meaning of virtus had to have existed in the
Roman vernacular, and therefore in Roman writing.

III. Battlefield Virtus
Jeremiah McCall, a modern scholar with an emphasis on
the Roman aristocracy and military, claims that “virtus could only
be demonstrated on the battlefield.” 133 While the term “only”
certainly raises contention, the Romans did frequently use virtus
used as a battlefield term. McCall discusses the role of the
aristocratic cavalry in the army of the Republic and how each
member of a cavalry unit was expected to exhibit virtus. 134 This
specific virtus included the ideals of martial courage, single
combat, and other ideas based on one’s position on the battlefield
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and Roman social hierarchy.
For the rank and file soldiers, virtus meant courage. These
classical warriors may have believed courage was based on the
ideals of “single combat,” or dueling, as J.E. Lendon argues. 135
These virtues would have been inherited from the classical stories
in the Illiad and Odyssey, two Greek stories, along with older Latin
tales. The Romans frequently translated and told the story of
Othryades, the Spartan warrior who stayed on the battlefield even
after all of his comrades had perished, and claimed victory as the
two remaining Argive soldiers retreated to inform Argos of their
victory. 136 This story involved the champions of Sparta and Argos
in combat with one another, with the Spartan Othryades continuing
to fight and stay on the battlefield despite the loss of his unit and
his own sustained wounds. This act of bravery would have inspired
many Roman soldiers to emulate such acts in their own military
careers.
Nathan Rosenstein takes the Greek connection further,
arguing that, instead of emulating the Illiad, the Roman soldiers
saw virtus as a code similar to the Spartan’s own military
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tradition. 137 This code included the sacred duty “not to flee” battle
and to hold formation. 138 Rosenstein suggests the Romans would
have adopted this code from early experiences with the Greek citystates in southern Italy, and to an even larger extent from
emulation of Pyrrhus during the Pyrrhic War. 139 This explanation
of virtus would further explain why the story of Othryades was so
popular among the Romans. The Roman manipular formation,
however, leant itself far more to a mobile and flexible style of
combat, meaning the rigid formation code of the Spartans would
not have worked well when integrated into that battle formation.
Lendon extrapolates the single-combat aspect of virtus in
soldiers to the formation the Romans adopted in the middle
Republic. 140 The traditional explanation for the Roman maniple is
that they abandoned the phalanx in favor of a looser, more flexible
formation in order to fight the Samnites and other peoples in Italy.
Lendon, however, argues that the ideal of virtus, his definition
focusing on single combat and competition, lent itself to a looser
formation in which individual soldiers could have their duels with
opposing soldiers. 141 This is an interesting argument, and one that
is not in conflict with the definition of Roman soldiers’ battlefield
137
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virtus. Each individual soldier sought their own glory in their
service to the Roman state, and the Roman maniple provided them
an excellent outlet to show off their military prowess to their
comrades, fostering competition and brotherhood as well. 142
The aristocratic elements of the Roman army viewed virtus
differently from their lower-class compatriots. Though singlecombat was also a major factor in their battlefield virtus, the
aristocracy did this specifically because they wished to acquire
spolia opima, or “noble spoils.” 143 These spoils would be stripped
off an enemy that they had slain, generally an aristocrat of the
opposing side. In addition to the spolia opima, pure exhibitions of
courage, such as putting oneself in more danger than the call of
duty would require, could be rewarded with military accolades. 144
Either of these, the spolia opima or a military award, would launch
an aristocrat’s political career forward, and enable them to begin
the long ascension in political offices known as the cursus
honorum. 145

IV. Virtus and the Aristocracy
A Roman aristocrat aspired to ascend to a political or
military position wherein they would be awarded imperium, or the
142
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right to command troops. These positions included the praetors,
consuls and dictators, though the dictatorship was never actively
sought by Republican aristocrats until the end of the Republic, as it
only served as an emergency position. 146 In numerous Latin
accounts from Livy, Cicero, Cato, and others, men who had
obtained imperium via the cursus honorum automatically had
virtus. Cicero specifically stated that a man with imperium had
“singular virtus.” 147 This commonality between accounts suggests
that virtus was not necessarily a moral trait achieved by great men,
but an omnipresent trait intrinsic in great men who obtained the
highest powers and honors in Roman society. The specifics of this
trait changed throughout Roman history on the basis of who the
top men in the Republic were and how they achieved their
victories on and off the battlefield.
Aristocratic males were born under their pater familias, the
head of the family who was usually the oldest male, and were
actually owned by him until either his death or their entrance into
Roman public life. The aristocratic pater familias was generally a
successful patrician, and often a senator who had done his military
service and at least part of the cursus honorum to earn himself a
seat in the Senate upon his retirement. A pater familias’s primary
duty to their male children was to provide them education and an
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entrance into public life; this training would have included military
exercises and moral behavior lessons. The indoctrination of Roman
patriotism and virtus began at a very young age. 148
Once in the military, an aristocrat would either join the
cavalry (if his family had a certain amount of wealth) or become
captain for one of the infantry maniples. Once on the battlefield,
the aristocrat could search for his single combat or great act of
bravery to get himself noticed by their commanders and the
Senate. Once the battlefield virtus had been established by
achieving one of these two goals (or simply through longevity of
decent military service), public office was assured for that
aristocrat.
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Often, high-status (born into more noteworthy

families) aristocrats would skip a few of the early offices and go
straight to quaestor, tribune or a local magistrate, offices not far
away from major roles that held imperium.
When off the battlefield, an aristocrat could still display
virtus. This more philosophical ideal of virtus included loyalty to
the Roman state and “general excellence” as described previously.
Competency in their role in public office, an accumulation of
wealth, or even just a prestigious family name could contribute to
the Senate’s consideration of an aristocrat’s virtus. Examples from
later Roman literature display these trends; such as Cicero’s claims
that Cato had virtus more for his public and administrative deeds
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than for his military successes.

150

Likewise, even later

commentators, such as Seneca, claimed that Cicero should be
commended for having superior virtus, though he had no military
successes to speak of. 151

V. Virtus and Imperium
Eventually the Roman aristocrat would achieve a
successful military career, a productive decade in public offices,
become a praetor, consul or dictator, and receive the Roman power
of imperium. Once imperium was achieved, the definition of virtus
in such a man with imperium changed immensely. In fact, the
meaning of virtus itself changed frequently depending on the man
with imperium and his degree of success. From roughly 390 BC to
the Punic Wars, the Romans preferred an offensive foreign policy
due to a national paranoia that took hold after the Gallic sack of
Rome in 390 BC. 152
The case of the Dictator Fabius Maximus perhaps best
exemplifies this view of virtus. During the Second Punic War,
Hannibal of Carthage invaded the Italian peninsula and managed to
penetrate deep into the Roman lands of Latium, Campania,
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Samnium, and other southern Italian regions. 153 The Romans sent
out their consuls and praetors, the first line of Republican military
defenses, and their armies in an attempt to stop Hannibal from
burning the Italian countryside. These consuls and praetors acted
with the standard meaning of virtus during the time: aggressive
attacking strategies, despite tactical disadvantages and numerical
inferiority. 154 Their rash actions, done in an attempt to prove their
virtus, led to the disastrous battle at Lake Trasimene in 217 BC. 155
Lake Trasimene represented one of the most catastrophic
defeats in Roman history up to that point. The Roman Consul
Flaminius went up against Hannibal’s forces with a small consular
army when Hannibal invaded Etruria in 217. Hannibal knew that
the Roman generals were culturally expected to act aggressively,
and so he moved his army around the fortified Roman position and
instigated a fight south of Flaminius’ favored ground. 156 Flaminius,
attempting to avoid looking like a coward, advanced quickly to
meet Hannibal’s numerically superior forces, at an area around
Lake

Trasimene.

As

Flaminius

advanced,

“No

sort

of

reconnaissance” was performed, according to Livy, which was an
unnecessarily risky maneuver. 157 Flaminius was overconfident in
his presumed victory, and a poorly calculated attack (if successful)
153
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would not only greatly boost his political career and reputation, but
would also display his virtus as well.
Unfortunately, Hannibal expected the Roman consul to act
in an overly aggressive and rash manner. His army had hidden in
wait on the hillside, and when the Romans marched past, he
signaled his troops to attack. Livy describes the outcome best:
“Down they came from the hills, each many by the nearest way,
taking the Romans totally unprepared.” 158 This battle resulted in
the entirety of the consular army being enslaved, killed, or
otherwise disbanded, as well as the death of consul Flaminius
himself. 159
In response to this catastrophic loss, the Roman Senate
elected Fabius Maximus as Dictator. With a dictator in charge, all
other positions that normally held imperium, such as the praetors
and consuls, had to give their armies over to the dictator, who had
supreme military control. Fabius had previously held the
consulship three times, and had military prestige from his victories
over the Ligurians in the 230s. 160 The situation that Fabius
presided over was very bleak. Roman morale was low due to
repeated defeats and Carthaginian ravaging of the countryside, and
his armies were incredibly fearful of engagement with the ever-
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victorious Hannibal. 161
In order to raise his soldiers’ morale, Fabius chose a new
strategy in waging the war. Instead of following Hannibal and
attempting a direct confrontation, he chose merely to shadow
Hannibal and perform minor assaults on the Carthaginian baggage
train and light infantry. Polybius claims Fabius wished to “incur no
danger and not to risk a battle, but to make the safety of his men
his first and greatest object.” 162 For a few months, this strategy
worked quite well. The morale of both the army and the Senate
rose quickly while under Fabius’ leadership. 163
Unfortunately, while the Romans suffered no major defeats
with Fabius’ strategy, the Senate and Fabius’ subordinates did not
see any massive victories either. The Master of Horse, Fabius’
second in command named Minucius, believed that Fabius had
become too timid, and so he began leading small bands of troops
into direct conflict with Hannibal’s army. Minucius, according to
Livy, established the meaning of virtus as it pertained to him and
the Senate: “Rome’s power grew by action and daring – not by
these do-nothing tactics, which the faint-hearted call caution.” 164
In conjunction with Minucius’ denouncement of Fabius, the
Senate and army showed their displeasure as well. While the
161
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Senate merely berated Fabius, his army was highly mutinous and
did not follow Fabius’ orders. 165 In fact, it seemed that “Had the
matter been put to a general vote, there is little doubt that the army
would have declared a preference to serve under Minucius rather
than Fabius.” 166 Fabius was seen as cowardly precisely because he
was attempting to protect his army from destruction, rather than
aggressively pursuing the enemy as previous generations had done
to grow “Rome’s power.” 167
As a result, when Fabius’ term as dictator ended, he was
not asked to return in any form to an office with imperium, and he
retired in relative disgrace compared to how most at least partiallysuccessful generals did. 168 Immediately after, two new consuls
were assigned to lead the Roman armies in a more aggressive
strike at Hannibal. The Battle of Cannae occurred, resulting in the
total annihilation of the Roman military yet again. 169 The Senate
received their wish of two imperium-wielding generals that
exhibited the aggressive aspects of virtus, and their reward was
another catastrophic loss.
VI. A Fluid Virtus
The Roman army had been defeated handily at Lake
Trasimene and Cannae. Further defeats, caused by the aggressive
165
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and rash decisions of Roman generals wishing to prove their virtus,
were still to come. Eventually, though, the Senate learned its
lesson. Fabius Maximus was brought out of retirement, and
entrusted with the task of keeping Rome’s morale high, as well as
orchestrating any necessary defense of the city.
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For the

remainder of the conflict with Hannibal, a more cautious strategy
was allowed, and even the Roman soldiers accepted such
leadership without mutiny. Fabius himself gained “the reputation
of an

outstanding commander”

and

contemporaries as well as future Romans.

was

loved

by his
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This shift represented a large change in Roman military
culture. Up to the time of Fabius, preemptive strike and an
aggressive military stance had been the normal mode of virtus for
Roman generals.
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Modern scholars, such as Lendon and

McDonnell, contend that the aggressive virtus continued full-force
past this point, all the way up to Augustus and the tragedy with
Varus and his legions along the Rhine.
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The Senate and

aristocratic conceptions of virtus, however, seem to have been
more pragmatic than that.
Not only was the Senate willing to allow a massive shift in
military policy after the relative success of Fabius’ strategy, future
170
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strategic decisions of its like were also allowed. 174 The Senate
praised future generals, not only for their aggressiveness if they
had that trait, but also for their shrewd cunning in achieving
victory. Frontinus remarks that the Senate “turned back to Fabius
and his strategy” numerous times after the Punic Wars. 175
By the time of the early Principate, there was certainly
admiration for generals who used more strategic means to achieve
victory. Livy claims that Fabius used “wise delaying tactics” and
further criticized the Senate and soldiers under Fabius for having
ever held “contempt” for their commander. 176 Suetonius, a Roman
biographer of the middle Principate, credited Augustus with
saying, “a cautious general is better than a bold one.” 177 While
Suetonius’ comment would not necessarily represent what was
thought during the early Principate/Late Republic, it at least shows
that by the time of the second century A.D. there was a significant
cultural shift in seeing virtus more as a path to victory, regardless
of exactly which path is taken, rather than a specific virtue.
The alternative view of many scholars focused on the
rigidly aggressive and martial courage definitions of virtus, such as
McDonnell, is that, by the time of the Principate, virtus had lost
most of its original meaning due to Greek influences and
174
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Augustus’ redefinitions of certain Roman cultural terms in order to
benefit himself. 178 This argument, however valid in explaining the
imperial definitions of virtus, does not explain the Senate’s
willingness to allow and actively promote the use of nonaggressive tactics and strategies in the wake of the Second Punic
War.

VII. Conclusion
Myles McDonnell finishes his book, Roman Manliness:
Virtus and the Roman Republic, with a short section on virtus in
the Principate. In this section, he claims that the Romans of this
period “could use both the martial and ethical meanings of virtus
frequently and naturally.” 179 By this time, virtus was a descriptor
given to those who achieved success in any major part of Roman
society, whether economic, political, military, or even religious.180
McDonnell argues that this change happened swiftly, with
Augustus having instituted most of the changes to the word virtus
and its public perception between the end of the Republic and the
first century AD. 181 McDonnell also argues, earlier in the book,
that men such as Cicero (from the late Republic) believed that
virtus was the main quality “responsible for Roman greatness,” and
that this quality had aspects in the military, political, and economic
178
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180
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sections of Roman society. 182
By the very nature of McDonnell’s argument and Cicero’s
belief that virtus was how the Romans expanded their control over
the Mediterranean, virtus had no single, static meaning. The
Romans had not extended their territorial empire across the
Mediterranean world simply through aggression and martial
courage, but with a myriad of resources including diplomacy,
wealth, and adept leadership. In fact, from the view of Cicero,
virtus may as well have been defined simply as “Roman
greatness.” 183
Modern scholars’ attempts to define virtus as a strictly
military word, and, worse, as a strictly military word with only a
single military definition, come from a modern wish to translate
words into easy, exact definitions. In order to translate virtus,
however, the context the word is used in ends up far more
important than the word itself. Roman generals had virtus in the
early Republic due to their aggressive tactics that their enemies
simply could not handle. During the latter years of the Second
Punic War, Fabius had virtus due to his successful policy of
cautious, periodic combat. Cato’s land had virtus, because a good
harvest could come from its dirt. Plautus’ slaves had virtus,
because they embodied the ideal Roman slave.
Virtus defined those who attained victory and success. It
182
183
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was not that one man had distinct “martial courage,” and hence had
virtus, because those who exhibited such a virtue and died had no
virtus, such as those consuls who recklessly lost their own lives
and those of their men at Lake Trasimene and Cannae. There was a
definition of virtus that was popular among the lower classes, as
exemplified by Fabius’ mutinous soldiers who wanted only an
aggressive general such as Minucius, but this definition was just as
fluid as the more generalized usage used at the higher levels of
Roman society. The ideas of the aristocracy seem to have trickled
down to the lower classes, as mutinies became less common over
the years and there seems to have been a general acceptance that
the general’s orders were to be followed regardless of moral issues
surrounding aggression and virtus. 184
McDonnell’s argument about the homogenization of the
term virtus during the Principate is certainly valid. The
homogenized use of virtus, however, had existed for much longer
than that. And before the homogenization of usage of the word,
which can be dated to the late Republican writers, the term itself
was fluid with its meaning. From defining the fertility of land to
the excellence of slaves to the martial courage of soldiers, virtus
was the primary word the Romans used to describe anything they
found to be successful or generally positive. If sources existed in a
more vernacular version of Latin, it is likely that virtus may have
184
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even shown up as a more or less synonym of the modern English
word “successful.” Unfortunately, without such a source to
analyze, the numerous shifting usages of virtus in the Latin lexicon
leave the scholar with only one real conclusion: virtus represented
“Roman excellence,” and had no single translation at any one time
in Roman history.
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